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Abstract 15
A game-theoretic model of handicap signalling over a pair of signalling 16
channels is introduced in order to determine when one channel has an evolu- 17
tionary advantage over the other. The stability conditions for honest hand- 18
icap signalling are presented for a single channel and are shown to conform 19
with the results of prior handicap signalling models. Evolutionary simula- 20
tions are then used to show that, for a two-channel system in which honest 21
signalling is possible on both channels, the channel featuring larger adver- 22
tisements at equilibrium is favoured by evolution. 23
This result helps to address a signiﬁcant tension in the handicap principle 24
literature. While the original theory was motivated by the prevalence of 25
extravagant natural signalling, contemporary models have demonstrated that 26
it is the cost associated with deception that stabilises honesty, and that the 27
honest signals exhibited at equilibrium need not be extravagant at all. 28
The current model suggests that while extravagant and wasteful signals 29
are not required to ensure a signalling system’s evolutionary stability, extrav- 30
agant signalling systems may enjoy an advantage in terms of evolutionary 31
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1. Introduction 36
Zahavi’s handicap principle was proposed as a way of accounting for the 37
evolution of honest signalling by linking the stability of a signalling system to 38
the costs involved in signal production (Zahavi, 1975, 1977). The handicap 39
principle asserts that a signalling system honestly advertising some property 40
(say the quality of a prospective mate, or the hunger of an oﬀspring, or 41
the escape ability of a prey item) will be resistant to invasion by cheats if 42
signalling imposes ﬁtness costs on signallers, and these costs allow signallers 43
with more of the advertised quality to distinguish themselves from those with 44
less by making larger signals (Grafen, 1990a). 45
This principle was originally inspired by the observation that many natu- 46
ral signals appear needlessly extravagant (Zahavi, 1975, 1977). Peacocks, for 47
example, construct and maintain a tail that is a signiﬁcant and, to the disin- 48
terested observer, irrational drain on resources. Might the same information 49
not be conveyed through a stable signalling system employing much cheaper 50
signals? Similarly, would it not make more sense for stags, stoneﬂies, man- 51
akins, and ﬁreﬂies to employ discrete and eﬃcient signals in preference to 52
the protracted, exhausting, and potentially dangerous bellowing, drumming, 53
dueting, and ﬂashing that they actually engage in? 54
A series of game theoretic treatments have shown that signal cost can 55
confer evolutionary stability on handicap signalling systems (e.g., Enquist, 56
31985; Grafen, 1990a; Godfray, 1991; Maynard Smith, 1991). However, a 57
subsequent set of treatments have argued that the equilibrium signalling in 58
such models is not “wasteful” and need not handicap signallers (e.g., Bullock, 59
1997; Getty, 1998, 2006). 60
In fact, in an early model, Hurd (1995) identiﬁes a scenario within a 61
handicap signalling model in which behaviours that advantage, rather than 62
handicap, signallers can be honest indicators of quality. We can describe his 63
result using the following contrived example. Consider an imaginary arboreal 64
primate. The females of this species are biased in their selection of which 65
males to mate with on the basis of a signal or indicator: whether a prospective 66
mate forages in the highest reaches of the canopy (attractive) or chooses to 67
forage amongst the lower branches (less attractive). Males that reach the 68
highest branches have access to the best of the fruits that they like to eat. 69
Consequently high-quality males, who are light and nimble, would prefer to 70
forage like this even in the absence of any beneﬁt derived from the “signalling 71
component” (Lotem et al., 1999) of their behaviour. However, poor-quality 72
males attempting the same foraging behaviour have a signiﬁcant chance of 73
falling. As a result, they prefer to forage lower down where there is less 74
risk of falling, even after factoring in the mating opportunities that they are 75
foregoing. At equilibrium, then, foraging behaviour (low or high) is an honest 76
indicator of mate quality (low or high). This signalling system is stabilised 77
by the cost of deceptive signalling (low quality males cannot aﬀord the risks 78
associated with deception), but the (honest) signals that are observed at 79
equilibrium are not costly handicaps, but instead are preferred behaviours 80
that deliver a direct beneﬁt to signallers. 81
4More generally, it is now understood that whether or not honesty will 82
persist over evolutionary time is determined by the net cost or net bene- 83
ﬁt associated with a move from honesty to dishonesty (the “marginal net 84
beneﬁt” of honesty), rather than the raw cost of signals made at equilib- 85
rium. Consequently, for handicap signalling systems stabilised by the cost 86
of signalling, signallers may produce honest signals of arbitrary raw cost at 87
equilibrium. That is, the space of diﬀerent handicap signalling systems in- 88
cludes those in which equilibrium signalling behaviour involves signals that 89
impose high gross ﬁtness costs on signallers, but also includes those that 90
impose low costs, zero cost, or even beneﬁts on signallers. Consequently, 91
handicap signalling need not be extravagant in the sense that observed sig- 92
nals are expected to be of (excessively) large magnitude (e.g., Bullock, 1997; 93
Hasson, 1997; Getty, 1998; Bergstrom et al., 2002). For a summary of this 94
modelling literature and a forceful statement of the arguments for reassess- 95
ing the handicap metaphor, see Hurd & Enquist (2005) and Getty (2006), 96
respectively. 97
Here, an alternative account for the evolution of extravagance is consid- 98
ered. Whereas previous game-theoretic models have tended to address the 99
evolutionary stability of honest communication on a single signalling chan- 100
nel, here a model is developed in which the evolution of signalling systems 101
that are able to competitively exclude one another can be explored. The hy- 102
pothesis to be examined is whether, when considering two signalling systems 103
that both have the potential to be stable and honest, the more extravagant 104
one (i.e, the signalling system employing advertisements of larger magnitude) 105
might enjoy a selective advantage. 106
52. Signalling Over One Channel 107
The model follows Grafen (1990a) in taking the form of a simple two- 108
player action-response game with continuous traits in which signallers seek 109
to elicit a positive response by advertising some private information that is of 110
interest to receivers. Here, the property being advertised is dubbed “quality”, 111
but could be any characteristic of interest to a receiver, including signaller 112
hunger, aggression, escape ability, etc. As such the model is intended to 113
be neutral with respect to many details of the signalling context, including 114
the genetics. If the model were to be refocussed on a speciﬁc context, e.g., 115
courtship signalling or oﬀspring begging, it might pay to include factors spe- 116
ciﬁc to such a context. As it is, this paper follows Grafen’s (1990a) approach 117
in minimising the inclusion of such details in order to achieve generality and 118
simplicity. 119
Player S, a signaller, makes an advertisement with positive perceived 120
magnitude a ≥ 0 on the basis of a randomly allocated degree of quality, q. 121
Player R, a receiver or responder, completes the bout of signalling by making 122
a response, r, on the basis of a but in ignorance of q. 123
Fitness scores are allocated such that R is rewarded for minimising the 124
diﬀerence between the magnitude of its response and the magnitude of sig- 125
naller quality.1, 126
wR =
1
1 + |r − q|
. (1)
1Note that, following Grafen (1990a), receivers are rewarded only for the accuracy
of their ability to estimate a signaller’s quality, and that over-estimation is treated as
equivalent to under-estimation. In reality, there may be situations where the impact of
receiver accuracy on ﬁtness varies with signaller quality, and where the ﬁtness consequences
of over-estimation diﬀer from those of under-estimation.
6Player S gains the beneﬁt (rqB) of receiving a response, r, from Player R, 127
but pays the cost (−aqC) of producing an advert, a. In each case the ﬁtness 128
contribution may be mediated by the signaller’s own quality, q, depending 129
on the values taken by the parameters B and C. 130
wS = rq
B − aq
C (2)
Where B is positive the impact of receiver response, r, on signaller ﬁtness 131
is greater for signallers with higher q. Where B is negative, this impact is 132
greater for signallers with lower q. Where B = 0 this impact is independent 133
of signaller quality. Analogously, the value taken by parameter C determines 134
whether the negative ﬁtness impact of advertising is greater for higher quality 135
signallers (C > 0) or lower quality signaller (C < 0) or is independent of 136
signaller quality (C = 0). For example, where B = 0 and C = −1, signallers 137
gain the same beneﬁt from a given receiver response irrespective of their 138
quality, while the cost to a signaller of producing a particular advertisement 139
decreases in direct proportion to signaller quality. 140
An honest signalling system for this game is a separating equilibrium 141
where signallers produce a unique advertisement, a, for each unique value 142
of quality, q, being advertised, and receiver response r will equal signaller 143
quality q. At the game’s non-signalling equilibrium signallers will produce 144
advertisements of zero magnitude for every value of quality being advertised, 145
and receivers will respond with a best guess at signaller quality. 146
In order to be stable, an honest signalling system must ensure that “better 147
signallers do better by advertising more” (Grafen, 1990a). This condition was 148
formulated by Grafen thus: 149
7∂wS/∂a
∂wS/∂r
is strictly increasing in q (3)
For the current model, this yields an inequality, (B − C)qC−B−1 > 0, 150
which is satisﬁed exclusively by conditions where B > C. In such scenarios, 151
any signaller with quality q enjoys an advantage over any competitor with 152
lower quality in terms of the marginal net cost of advertising. 153
[Figure 1 about here.] 154
Figure 1 locates this ﬁnding within a wider set of models of handicap 155
signalling. For example, the area of ﬁgure 1 satisfying the inequality C < 0 156
represents Zahavi’s (1975; 1977) claim that honest signalling will be stable 157
where signalling costs are lower for those signallers with more of the prop- 158
erty being advertised. The current model suggests that Zahavi’s handicap 159
criterion is neither necessary nor suﬃcient for the stability of honest sig- 160
nalling. However, the current model is consistent with the results of several 161
subsequent models. 162
Models addressing the signalling of need have sometimes assumed that 163
the cost of signal production is independent of signaller need, i.e., C = 0 (e.g., 164
Godfray, 1991; Maynard Smith, 1991). These models have concluded that, 165
in order for such signalling to be honest, the beneﬁts to signallers of observer 166
behaviour must increase with need, i.e., B > 0 (cf. the heavy vertical arrow 167
in ﬁgure 1). 168
A complementary set of models addressing the signalling of quality have 169
assumed that the beneﬁt to signallers of an observer response is indepen- 170
dent of signaller quality, i.e., B = 0 (e.g., Hurd, 1995). These models have 171
8concluded that, in order for such signalling to be honest, the cost of signal 172
production must decrease with signaller quality, i.e., C < 0 (cf. the heavy 173
horizontal arrow in ﬁgure 1). 174
Finally, Grafen’s (1990a) result can be represented by the cross-hatched 175
region in ﬁgure 1: assuming signaller beneﬁts either increase with quality 176
(B > 0) or are independent of it (B = 0), Zahavi’s constraints on signalling 177
costs (C < 0) must hold in order that signalling may be honest. While the 178
current model is consistent with this tightening of Zahavi’s claims, the space 179
of stable, honest signalling scenarios deﬁned by Grafen is not coincident with 180
the predictions of the current model. Rather, since the area deﬁned by B ≥ 0 181
and C < 0 is a proper sub-set of the region deﬁned by B > C, Grafen’s result 182
represents a special case of the current model’s ﬁndings. 183
In order to understand how the current model departs from the reasoning 184
of Zahavi, consider the class of scenarios speciﬁed by B > C > 0 (represented 185
by the unhatched shaded region in ﬁgure 1). Any signalling channel for which 186
C > 0 fails to satisfy Zahavi’s handicap condition for honest signalling. But 187
where B > C > 0 the current model predicts that honest signalling will be 188
evolutionarily stable. This class of scenario corresponds to a case in which, 189
say, nestlings are advertising their need by begging. Hungrier nestlings ﬁnd it 190
more costly to beg than their well-fed competitors (C > 0), but this is more 191
than compensated for by the fact that hungrier nestlings stand to beneﬁt 192
more from parental response (B > C). As a consequence, it makes sense for 193
a hungrier chick to beg more than a less needy nestmate even though it costs 194
the hungrier chick more to do so. 195
By contrast, consider the class of scenarios speciﬁed by B < C < 0 196
9(represented by the unshaded hatched region in ﬁgure 1). Any signalling 197
channel for which C < 0 satisﬁes Zahavi’s handicap condition for honest 198
signalling. But where B < C < 0, the current model predicts that honest 199
signalling will not be evolutionarily stable. Glossed in the same terms as the 200
example above, this class of scenario corresponds to a case in which (for some 201
reason) needier chicks ﬁnd it less costly to beg than their well-fed nestmates 202
(C < 0), but this advantage is extinguished by the fact that they are less 203
able to extract the ﬁtness beneﬁt from parental response (B < C). Perhaps 204
they are not able to metabolise food as eﬃciently as well-fed chicks (Grafen, 205
1990a). As a consequence it does not make sense for a hungrier chick to beg 206
more than a less needy nestmate even though it costs the hungrier chick less 207
to do so. 208
2.1. Simulation 209
In order to explore the attainability of the honest signalling equilibria 210
described in the previous section, the model is translated into a simple sim- 211
ulation. Player S, is allocated a degree of quality, q, drawn at random from 212
a uniform distribution over the range [qmin,qmax] and inherits a signalling 213
strategy  Sα,Sβ  that deﬁnes a mapping, q  → a. Similarly, player R inherits 214
a response strategy  Rα,Rβ  that deﬁnes a mapping, a  → r. 215
During each bout of signalling, S makes an advertisement with positive 216
magnitude a on the basis of q, 217
a = max(0,sgn(Sα)q
|Sα| + Sβ). (4)
R completes the bout of signalling by making a response, r, on the basis 218
10of a, 219
r = sgn(Rα)a
|Rα| + Rβ. (5)
[Figure 2 about here.] 220
This ensures that, while low-dimensional and smooth, the strategy spaces 221
of S and R comprise a range of mappings from q to a and from a to r that 222
are variously increasing, decreasing, accelerating, decelerating, or ﬂat (see 223
ﬁgure 2). Note that as a consequence of the requirement that a ≥ 0, even 224
where a signalling mapping is not ﬂat, it may be truncated such that either 225
some low- or high-quality signallers make advertisements of zero magnitude. 226
At the conclusion of a bout, scores are allocated to R and S on the basis of 227
equations (1) and (2). 228
During each simulated generation, each member of a population of N 229
signallers is uniquely paired with a member of a population of N receivers 230
(N = 1000 for all results reported here). Each pair engage in a single bout of 231
signalling, after which scores are allocated. Once all pairs have been scored, a 232
new generation of receivers is bred by selecting (with replacement) N parents 233
from the receiver population with probability proportional to their score. 234
Oﬀspring inherit the response strategy of their parent, subject to unbiased 235
mutation in which a perturbation on each strategy component is drawn from 236
the normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation 0.01. 237
A new generation of signallers is bred in a similar fashion. However, 238
since signaller scores may be negative, the probability with which parents 239
are selected from the signaller population is inversely proportional to the 240
rank of their score within the population, rather than proportional to the 241
11raw score itself. Inherited signaller strategies are mutated in the manner 242
described for response strategies, above. 243
The new generation of signallers and receivers are then paired, engage in 244
a bout of signalling and bred as before. The simulation is terminated after 245
G generations of this process (G = 5000 for all results reported here). 246
Note that, following Grafen (1990b), we model the co-evolution of sig- 247
naller and receiver strategies without genetic linkage. This allows the model 248
to represent many handicap signalling contexts, but does not realistically 249
capture the genetics when signaller and receiver are related (e.g., parental in- 250
vestment) or signalling is between the sexes of a single species (e.g., courtship 251
signalling). 252
Before reporting the simulation’s behaviour, we will explicitly deﬁne what 253
we mean by the term extravagance. A signalling system, S, comprises an 254
equilibrium signalling strategy, S∗, and the associated equilibrium receiver 255
strategy, R∗. One signalling system, S1, will be said to be strictly more 256
extravagant than another, S2, if the advertisements made under S1 are of 257
greater magnitude. 258
Z qmax
qmin
S
∗
1(q)dq >
Z qmax
qmin
S
∗
2(q)dq. (6)
Here, S∗
i (q) is the magnitude of the advertisement generated by a signaller 259
of quality q using the equilibrium signaller strategy from signalling system i. 260
3. One Channel: Simulation Results 261
First, we corroborate that honest signalling equilibria exist only for sce- 262
narios in which B > C. For each simulation run, signaller and receiver 263
12populations were initialised with random strategies, where each element of 264
every player’s strategy was drawn from a uniform distribution [−1,1]. After a 265
period of simulated coevolution, the resultant signalling behaviour was char- 266
acterised by two measurements. Receiver prediction error, ǫ, was employed 267
as a proxy for honesty, and signal range, ρ, as a proxy for extravagance.2
268
For a particular signalling strategy, the signal range was determined by 269
the signed diﬀerence between the magnitude of a when q = qmax and the 270
magnitude of a when q = qmin. For each simulated scenario, ¯ ρ was calculated 271
as 272
¯ ρ = ¯ S(qmax) − ¯ S(qmin) (7)
Here, ¯ S(q) is the magnitude of the advertisement generated by a signaller 273
of quality, q, employing the mean signaller strategy,  ¯ Sα, ¯ Sβ . For all results 274
reported here qmin = 1 and qmax = 5. 275
For a particular pair of signaller and response strategies, receiver error 276
was calculated as the mean diﬀerence between signaller quality and receiver 277
response across bouts of signalling spanning the range of quality values. For 278
each simulated scenario, ¯ ǫ was calculated as 279
2Note that (i) the space of signalling strategies used here guarantees that a will always
be a monotonic function of q, and (ii) we expect that for any honest signalling system
a ≈ 0 for signaller with quality q = qmin. This allows us to use the diﬀerence between
the magnitude of the advertisement given by the lowest and highest quality signallers as a
proxy for extravagance. We could also have used the average advertisement magnitude, or
calculated the extravagance using equation (6) without qualitatively changing the results
reported here. However, the signal range metric employed here has an advantage in that
its sign diﬀerentiates signallers whose advertisements increase with q from those whose
advertisements decrease with q, or do not vary with q and are therefore uninformative.
13¯ ǫ =
1
Q
Q X
j=1
| ¯ R(¯ S(qj)) − qj| (8)
Here, qj is drawn from a set of Q values evenly distributed between qmin 280
and qmax, and ¯ R(a) is the magnitude of the response to an advertisement of 281
magnitude a generated by the mean response strategy,   ¯ Rα, ¯ Rβ . 282
Note that the stochasticity introduced by mutation ensures that an evolv- 283
ing population will never reach a true equilibrium. We classify a simula- 284
tion run as having achieved an honest signalling equilibrium where the ﬁ- 285
nal receiver population’s mean receiver error is below some threshold level, 286
¯ ǫ < ǫthresh. (For this to be the case it must also be true that ¯ ρ  = 0). For all 287
results reported here ǫthresh = 0.3. 288
[Figure 3 about here.] 289
First consider stereotypical examples of the evolution of an honest sig- 290
nalling equilibrium and a non-signalling equilibrium, depicted in ﬁgure 3. 291
Solid curves represent the case in which conditions for stable honesty are 292
satisﬁed (B > C), whereas dashed curves represent the case where these 293
conditions are not satisﬁed (B < C). In the latter case, both highest qual- 294
ity and lowest quality signallers evolve to produce advertisements with zero 295
magnitude, and receivers evolve to guess signaller quality, achieving a predic- 296
tion error of ¯ ǫ = 0.5, which is the best that can be achieved in the absence of 297
any information from signallers. Conversely, where B > C, highest quality 298
signallers evolve to make advertisements of magnitude approx. 10, while low- 299
est quality signallers again evolve to produce advertisements of approx. zero 300
magnitude, and receivers are able to achieve low response error, ¯ ǫ < ǫthresh. 301
14The evolution of the associated strategy parameters is depicted in ﬁgure 4. 302
For B > C, Sα and Rα stabilise rapidly with the remaining two parameters 303
compensating for one another from around generation 2000. For B < C, 304
signallers rapidly evolve negative strategy parameters that guarantee zero 305
magnitude advertisements. Receivers have little selection pressure on their 306
Rα value as, in the absence of advertisements, the magnitude of their response 307
is dominated by Rβ, which stabilises at a value of around (qmin + qmax)/2, 308
which is a best guess of signaller quality in the absence of any information 309
from signaller behaviour. 310
[Figure 4 about here.] 311
Figure 5 depicts how these measures vary with model parameters B and 312
C. Where B < C, non-signalling equilibria are achieved: all signallers, ir- 313
respective of quality, make uninformative advertisements of zero magnitude 314
(¯ ρ ≈ 0), and receivers make responses of magnitude r ≈ (qmax − qmin)/2. 315
Conversely, where B > C, honest signalling equilibria are always achieved: 316
signallers make honest advertisements such that higher quality signallers em- 317
ploy larger advertisements (¯ ρ > 0), and receivers are able to recover signaller 318
quality from these advertisements with low error (¯ ǫ < ǫthresh). Where B = C 319
signalling behaviour repeatedly evolves but is not stable. In summary, simu- 320
lated populations had no trouble reaching honest signalling equilibria when 321
these equilibria were predicted to exist, and at these equilibria honest sig- 322
nalling behaviour was tightly determined by model parameters such that ¯ ρ 323
increased exponentially with B − C (see ﬁgure 6). 324
[Figure 5 about here.] 325
15[Figure 6 about here.] 326
[Figure 7 about here.] 327
Note that the absolute values of B and C do not inﬂuence the signalling 328
behaviour which is determined by the diﬀerence between B and C. This 329
means that the model’s behaviour does not distinguish between the regions 330
of parameter space depicted in ﬁgure 1. For instance, ﬁgure 7 shows that 331
scenarios within the region identiﬁed by Grafen are equivalent to those in 332
the B > C > 0 region so long as they share a value for B − C. 333
4. Signalling Over Two Channels 334
Next, we consider what kind of equilibrium signalling behaviour we might 335
expect to evolve where more than one signalling channel exists. When two 336
signalling channels (which may diﬀer in the signalling costs that they impose) 337
are made available to signallers, and receivers must choose which to attend 338
to3, can we predict whether one channel will be favoured by evolution, and 339
if so, which? 340
We extend the current model by including in the expression for signaller 341
ﬁtness a second cost term associated with the additional signalling channel. 342
wS = rq
B − a1q
C1 − a2q
C2 (9)
Here, C1 and C2 are new model parameters that determine the manner 343
in which signaller quality mediates the cost of signalling on channels one and 344
3Since only one channel may be attended to, this is not a model in which we can explore
the evolution of multiple simultaneous signals, either for reasons of increased redundancy
or for conveying multiple messages (Johnstone, 1995a, 1996).
16two, respectively. Receiver ﬁtness is calculated as before. Following straight- 345
forwardly from the single channel case, the evolutionary stability conditions 346
for honesty on each signalling channel are, B > C1 and B > C2, respec- 347
tively. Where only one of the channels (or neither) supports stable honest 348
signalling, the question of equilibrium selection is moot. However, if both 349
channels admit stable honest communication (e.g., B > C1,C2), there exists 350
the possibility that one channel might enjoy an advantage over the other. 351
Without loss of generality, assume that C1 > C2. At the outset of any 352
unbiased evolutionary competition between the two evolving signalling sys- 353
tems, the net cost of signalling on channel two must, ceteris paribus, be low- 354
est. Consider that, in such a scenario, on average receivers can be expected 355
initially to treat each channel identically. Hence, 356
ws1 = rq
B − aq
C1 < ws2 = rq
B − aq
C2 (10)
In general, where both signalling channels are able to support stable hon- 357
est signalling (i.e., B > C1 and B > C2), Eq (10) shows that the sign of 358
C1 − C2 will determine which signalling channel enjoys an initial selective 359
advantage, and the magnitude of C1 − C2 will determine the extent of this 360
advantage. 361
5. Two Channels: Simulation Results 362
Here, the original simulation has been augmented such that signallers now 363
inherit a strategy specifying two mappings, q  → a1 and q  → a2. Likewise, 364
receivers now inherit a mapping for each signalling channel, a1  → r and 365
a2  → r, and, in addition, a switch, γ ∈ {1,2}, that speciﬁes to which channel 366
17the receiver will exclusively attend. Since this switch element may take only 367
two values, mutation via Gaussian perturbation is inappropriate. Rather, 368
during reproduction, a parental γ value is swapped for the alternative allele 369
with mutation probability, m (m = 0.05 for all results reported here). 370
Signallers are thus free to employ one, both or neither of the two signalling 371
channels, while receivers are free to develop a diﬀerent response strategy for 372
each channel, but are constrained to employ one or the other. 373
[Figure 8 about here.] 374
Figure 8 depicts the evolutionary change in signaller and receiver be- 375
haviour for a scenario where two channels satisfy handicap signalling condi- 376
tions. On channel 1 (C = −2), signalling behaviour stabilises after around 377
2000 generations with a ≈ 35 for highest quality signallers and a ≈ 0 for low- 378
est quality signallers. Receivers evolve to pay attention to channel 1 within 379
the ﬁrst few generations and achieve low response error after 500 generations. 380
By contrast, on channel 2 (C = −1.5) advertising is rapidly extinguished, and 381
the (unused) receiver strategy (which is under very weak selection pressure) 382
is unable to produce a good estimate of signaller quality. 383
More generally, the model’s parameters B, C1 and C2 now deﬁne a three- 384
space over which we can explore signalling system evolution. In order to 385
visualise the results clearly, ﬁgure 9 depicts the model’s behaviour over the 386
C1 × C2 plane with the third parameter value held constant (B = 0). (The 387
model’s behaviour is qualitatively similar for other values of B, mutatis mu- 388
tandis.) Since the only diﬀerence between channels one and two is captured 389
by the relationship between C1 and C2, we should expect the panels in ﬁg- 390
ure 9 to exhibit symmetry about C1 = C2. In addition to this symmetry, 391
18by comparing the two panels of ﬁgure 9 it is apparent that the attainability 392
of honest signalling equilibria increases as either C1 or C2 fall below B, and 393
that in any scenario where both channels admit of an honest signalling equi- 394
librium, whichever channel exhibits advertisements of larger magnitude at 395
equilibrium enjoys an advantage in terms of evolutionary attainability (see 396
ﬁgure 10). 397
[Figure 9 about here.] 398
[Figure 10 about here.] 399
5.1. Competition Between Established Signalling Systems 400
[Figure 11 about here.] 401
Here we simulate abrupt contact between two stable signalling systems 402
that have evolved to equilibrium in isolation. One more extravagant “invad- 403
ing” system for which C1 = −2 encounters a less extravagant “incumbent” 404
system for which C2 = −1 (the labels “invading” and “incumbent” are arbi- 405
trary and could be reversed). 406
Initially we allow each system to evolve in isolation as per the rubric 407
of section 2. We ﬁx B = 0, ensuring that, since B − C1 > B − C2 > 408
0, the equilibrium signalling behaviour in the invading population will be 409
more extravagant than that in the incumbent population, but both signalling 410
systems will be stable and honest. 411
We then create a new mixed population of N = 1000 signallers by select- 412
ing a random proportion p of individuals from the signaller population of the 413
invading system and combining them with a random proportion 1−p of indi- 414
viduals from the signaller population of the incumbent system (the remaining 415
19signallers are discarded). We construct a mixed receiver population in the 416
same way, with the same ratio of individuals from the two wild-type receiver 417
populations. From this initial condition we simulate a further G = 5000 418
generations of evolution. 419
By varying p we can determine that the more extravagant signalling sys- 420
tem enjoys an advantage under these circumstances, being able to achieve 421
ﬁxation (at the expense of the less extravagant signalling system) under a 422
wider range of initial conditions. For the systems depicted in ﬁgure 11, the 423
extravagant invading system achieves ﬁxation in the majority of simulation 424
runs when it accounts for only 45% or more of the initial population. Where 425
the two signalling systems are initially equally represented in the population 426
(p = 0.5), the more extravagant system achieves ﬁxation in 90% of cases. 427
Despite its nominal disadvantage the weaker signalling system is evolu- 428
tionarily stable, not only against rare mutants (which is attested to by the 429
results presented in section 3), but also against large numbers of signallers 430
and receivers with strategies that are optimally co-adapted to each other. 431
For both of the systems simulated here, an invading population fully half the 432
size of the incumbent population (p = 1
3) is extremely unlikely to oust the 433
incumbent signalling system. 434
6. Discussion 435
The model presented here suggests that there are grounds for expect- 436
ing handicap signalling to appear extravagant—signalling systems employ- 437
ing channels that exhibit signals of larger perceived magnitude at equilibrium 438
are favoured by evolution. It might appear to be consistent with Zahavi’s 439
20(1975; 1977) original arguments that evolution favours the largest and thus 440
most costly signalling system. However, it is more accurate to conclude that, 441
within the space of signalling channels that satisfy handicap signalling crite- 442
ria, it is those that are cheapest that are advantaged and that this cheapness 443
also results in escalated levels of advertisement magnitude. 444
Consider two competing signalling channels characterised by B > C1 > 445
C2. We have seen that while honest signalling is possible on either channel, in 446
general signals will be cheaper on channel 2. Results presented here support 447
two intuitions: ﬁrst, signallers that employ the cheaper channel will tend to 448
enjoy a selective advantage; second, in order to impose signalling costs of a 449
magnitude suﬃcient to stabilise signalling on the cheaper channel, greater 450
evolutionary escalation of advertisement magnitude will be required. 451
How generally should these results be expected to hold? First I will 452
consider issues raised by the implementation of the model as a simulation. 453
Second I will consider constraints on generality due to the form of the model 454
itself. 455
The initial game theoretic treatment presented in section 2 introduces 456
some theoretical assumptions in the form of game structures and ﬁtness func- 457
tions. However, the subsequent evolutionary simulation model additionally 458
involves an explicit ﬁtness landscape (i.e., a genetic encoding that imposes 459
a neighbourhood relationship over strategies) and a speciﬁc algorithm that 460
moves an explicit, ﬁnite population across this landscape, using particular 461
genetic operators and mechanisms for selecting between potential parents. 462
How conﬁdent can we be that the way the model behaves can be attributed 463
to the form of the game and its ﬁtness functions, rather than the algorithmic 464
21devices introduced in order to implement it as an individual-based simulation 465
model? The analytic intractability of simulation models typically prevents 466
a conclusive answer to this question, just as the reliance of a mathemat- 467
ical model on its idealising assumptions (e.g., an inﬁnite population, zero 468
sampling error, diﬀerentiable ﬁtness functions) can be hard to assess. 469
However, the behaviour of the current model is robust to alternative 470
strategy space encodings (e.g., restricting signallers and receivers to linear 471
mappings of the form a = mq+c or a = q tan(θ)+c), alternative genetic oper- 472
ators (e.g., a range of mutation operators), alternative selection mechanisms 473
(e.g., local competition between neighbouring members of a population dis- 474
tributed over a two-dimensional rectangular lattice), and alternative initial 475
conditions (e.g., converged on non-signalling equilibrium behaviour). 476
The relationship between the ﬁndings presented here and the more fun- 477
damental assumptions made in deﬁning the game itself is less clear and de- 478
serves more analysis, particularly as the form of the equations governing 479
key relationships was inﬂuenced as much by their simplicity as their real- 480
ism. The game employs continuous traits where a small change in, say, a 481
signaller’s quality or the magnitude of an advertisement results in a small 482
change in the cost associated with making that advertisement. This need 483
not be true of models that employ discrete traits where the notion of cheap 484
signals escalating in magnitude until they achieve evolutionary stability may 485
not hold. The model does not explicitly address the genetics of signalling 486
systems where signallers and receivers may reproduce sexually, or may be 487
related. The game does not include noise on signal production or perception, 488
and does not recognise the diﬀerence between the receiver’s perception of 489
22an advertisement’s magnitude and that of the signaller. As a consequence 490
of these simpliﬁcations, we can expect signallers with minimum quality to 491
make advertisements of zero magnitude. This expectation is unlikely to sur- 492
vive a more sophisticated treatment of the psychophysics of the signaller and 493
receiver roles, e.g., the inclusion of perceptual error, “just noticeable diﬀer- 494
ences” in magnitude and how these scale with the magnitude of a stimulus. 495
Finally, the current model assumes (along with previous models, e.g., 496
Grafen, 1990a) that receivers are selected for their raw accuracy in estimat- 497
ing signaller quality. The impact on receiver ﬁtness of overestimation is 498
deemed equivalent to that of underestimation, and independent of the true 499
value being advertised. These assumptions seem rather crude when con- 500
trasted with the subtle attention paid to signaller ﬁtness, and are unlikely 501
to hold for many natural signalling systems where, for instance, mistakenly 502
ﬂeeing contests with weaklings has very diﬀerent implications to erroneously 503
ﬁghting much stronger opponents, and passing over ﬁrst-class suitors diﬀers 504
signiﬁcantly from bearing the oﬀspring of poor quality mates. Future work 505
will adapt the simulation paradigm employed here to use the outcomes of 506
receiver decision making as a more appropriate proxy for ﬁtness than the 507
raw accuracy of their estimations of signaller quality. 508
7. Conclusion 509
Zahavi’s (1975) estimation that extravagant and exaggerated handicaps 510
are widespread or even endemic within natural signalling systems has proven 511
diﬃcult to assess empirically (see, e.g., Johnstone, 1995b; Kilner & John- 512
stone, 1997; Godfray & Johnstone, 2000; Kotianho, 2001). While the work 513
23presented here reiterates that natural handicaps need not incur high costs 514
(or indeed, any cost) at equilibrium, it does predict that under some cir- 515
cumstances a handicap signalling system will tend to involve signals of large 516
subjective magnitude. This result might account for our impression of the 517
abundance of extravagance in natural signals—especially if there is signiﬁ- 518
cant correlation between our sensory apparatus and that of the receivers for 519
which the signals were evolved. 520
Acknowledgements 521
This paper beneﬁted from conversation with the late John Maynard 522
Smith, Rufus Johnstone, Richard Watson, Jason Noble, James Dyke and 523
the University of Leeds Biosystems group, and from the comments of anony- 524
mous reviewers. 525
References 526
Bergstrom, C. T., Sz´ amad´ o, S., & Lachmann, M. (2002). Separating equi- 527
libria in continuous signalling games. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B, 357, 528
1595–1606. 529
Bullock, S. (1997). An exploration of signalling behaviour by both analytic 530
and simulation means for both discrete and continuous models. In P. Hus- 531
bands, & I. Harvey (Eds.), Proceedings of the Fourth European Conference 532
on Artiﬁcial Life (pp. 454–463). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 533
Enquist, M. (1985). Communication during aggressive interactions with par- 534
ticular reference to variation in choice of behaviour. Anim. Behav., 33, 535
1152–1161. 536
24Getty, T. (1998). Handicap signalling: when fecundity and viability do not 537
add up. Anim. Behav., 56, 127–130. 538
Getty, T. (2006). Sexually selected signals are not similar to sports handicaps. 539
Trends Ecol. Evol., 21, 83–88. 540
Godfray, H. C. J. (1991). Signalling of need by oﬀspring to their parents. 541
Nature, 352, 328–330. 542
Godfray, H. C. J., & Johnstone, R. A. (2000). Begging and bleating: The 543
evolution of parent-oﬀspring signalling. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B, 355, 544
1581–1591. 545
Grafen, A. (1990a). Biological signals as handicaps. J. Theor. Biol., 144, 546
517–546. 547
Grafen, A. (1990b). Sexual selection unhandicapped by the Fisher process. 548
J. Theor. Biol., 144, 473–516. 549
Hasson, O. (1997). Towards a general theory of biological signaling. J. Theor. 550
Biol., 185, 139–156. 551
Hurd, P. L. (1995). Communication in discrete action-response games. J. 552
Theor. Biol., 174, 217–222. 553
Hurd, P. L., & Enquist, M. (2005). A strategic taxonomy of biological com- 554
munication. Anim. Behav., 70, 1155–1170. 555
Johnstone, R. A. (1995a). Honest advertisement of multiple qualities using 556
mutiple signals. J. Theor. Biol., 177, 87–94. 557
25Johnstone, R. A. (1995b). Sexual selection, honest advertisement, and the 558
handicap principle: Reviewing the evidence. Biol. Rev., 70, 1–65. 559
Johnstone, R. A. (1996). Multiple displays in animal communication: 560
“backup signals” and “multiple messages”. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. 561
B, 352, 329–338. 562
Kilner, R., & Johnstone, R. A. (1997). Begging the question: are oﬀspring 563
solicitation behaviours signals of need? Trends Ecol. Evol., 12, 11–15. 564
Kotianho, J. S. (2001). Costs of sexual traits: a mismatch between theoretical 565
considerations and empirical evidence. Biol. Rev., 76, 365–376. 566
Lotem, A., Wagner, R. H., & Balshine-Earn, S. (1999). The overlooked 567
signaling component of nonsignaling behavior. Behav. Ecol., 10, 209–212. 568
Maynard Smith, J. (1991). Honest signalling: The Philip Sidney game. Anim. 569
Behav., 42, 1034–1035. 570
Zahavi, A. (1975). Mate selection — A selection for a handicap. J. Theor. 571
Biol., 53, 205–214. 572
Zahavi, A. (1977). The cost of honesty (further remarks on the handicap 573
principle). J. Theor. Biol., 67, 603–605. 574
26List of Figures 575
1 Schematic representation of the current model’s B×C param- 576
eter space, indicating the handicap signalling regime suggested 577
by Zahavi (1975, 1977), C < 0 (diagonal hatching), and the 578
handicap signalling regimes suggested by models due to Grafen 579
(1990a): B ≥ 0 and C < 0 (cross-hatching); Godfray (1991) 580
and Maynard Smith (1991): vertical arrow deﬁned by B > 0 581
and C = 0; and Hurd (1995): horizontal arrow deﬁned by 582
B = 0 and C < 0). The current model predicts that honesty 583
will be stable when B > C (grey shaded region) which is not 584
consistent with Zahavi’s original claim, but is consistent with 585
the ﬁndings of the subsequent models represented here. . . . . 31 586
2 Examples of signalling strategies mapping a signaller’s private 587
quality, q, onto a public advertisement of perceived magnitude 588
a. For all functions depicted, Sβ = 10, with Sα varying from 589
+2 (uppermost) through zero (horizontal) to −2 (lowermost). 590
Note that advertisements may not have negative magnitude. . 32 591
3 Change in signaller behaviour (upper panel) and receiver be- 592
haviour (lower panel) over evolutionary time under conditions 593
that support honest signalling (B = 0, C = −1; solid curves) 594
and conditions that do no (B = 0, C = +1; dashed curves). 595
For signallers, a pair of curves indicate evolutionary change 596
in the magnitude of advertisements (a) given by highest qual- 597
ity and lowest quality signallers employing the mean signaller 598
strategy at each generation during two representative simu- 599
lation runs. For receivers, each curve indicates evolutionary 600
change in the receiver error (¯ ǫ) produced by receivers employ- 601
ing the mean receiver strategy at each generation during the 602
same two simulation runs. The dotted grey line at ¯ ǫ = ǫthresh 603
indicates the threshold on receiver error that was used to dis- 604
tinguish the attainment of honest signalling from failure to do 605
so. Parameters: G = 5000, N = 1000, qmin = 1, qmax = 5, 606
ǫthresh = 0.3, Q = 400. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 607
274 Evolution of signaller and receiver parameters for the two sim- 608
ulation runs depicted in ﬁgure 3. For both cases B = 0. The 609
upper panel shows the successful evolution of an honest sig- 610
nalling system where C = −1. The lower panel shows the 611
evolution of a non-signalling equilibrium where C = +1. . . . 34 612
5 Isoclines representing mean signal range (¯ ρ) in the ﬁnal gen- 613
eration of simulation runs sampling 17×17 evenly distributed 614
points in the B × C parameter space. Each data point rep- 615
resents an average over 25 simulations runs. Where B < C, 616
¯ ρ ≈ 0 and ¯ ǫ ≈ 0.5, i.e., non-signalling equilibria were attained. 617
Where B > C, ¯ ρ > 0 (increasing exponentially with B − C) 618
and ¯ ǫ ≪ ǫthresh, i.e., signalling equilibria were attained. Pa- 619
rameters: G = 5000, N = 1000, qmin = 1, qmax = 5, n = 25, 620
ǫthresh = 0.3, Q = 400. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 621
6 Data from the simulation runs depicted in ﬁgure 5 aggregated 622
and re-plotted against B − C. The dashed curve shows the 623
proportion of runs achieving an honest signalling equilibrium 624
(i.e., for which ¯ ǫ < ǫthresh). The solid curve shows the average 625
value of ¯ ρ normalised w.r.t. the maximum observed ¯ ρ value 626
(std. dev. values were small, varying between 1% and 3% of 627
the mean). The inset plot re-plots the solid curve on a log scale. 36 628
7 Honest signalling system behaviour for ten distinct scenarios 629
for which B > C. Ten evolved signaller mappings, q  → a, 630
separate into two bundles, one for scenarios where B −C = 1 631
(grey curves, a) and one for scenarios where B −C = 2 (solid 632
curves, A). In each case, receiver strategies produce responses, 633
r, that are near optimal (i.e., the dashed response curves lie 634
close to the dotted line, q  → r∗). The two sets of {B,C} sce- 635
narios depicted are {{−1,−2}, {0,−1}, {1,0}, {2,1}, {3,2}} 636
(grey) and {{0,−2}, {1,−1}, {2,0}, {3,1}, {4,2}} (black). 637
Simulation parameters are as per ﬁgure 5. . . . . . . . . . . . 37 638
288 Change in signaller behaviour (upper panel) and receiver be- 639
haviour (lower panel) over evolutionary time under conditions 640
that support honest signalling on two competing signalling 641
channels (B = 0, C1 = −2, solid curves; B = 0, C2 = −1.5, 642
dashed curves). For signallers, a pair of curves for each chan- 643
nel indicate evolutionary change in the magnitude of adver- 644
tisements (a) given by highest quality and lowest quality sig- 645
nallers employing the mean signaller strategy at each gener- 646
ation during a representative simulation run. For receivers, 647
two curves indicate evolutionary change in the receiver error 648
(¯ ǫ) produced by receivers employing the mean receiver strat- 649
egy for each channel at each generation during the same sim- 650
ulation run. A third curve (grey) indicates the proportion 651
of receivers paying attention to channel 1. The dotted grey 652
line at ¯ ǫ = ǫthresh = 0.3 indicates the threshold on receiver 653
error that was used to distinguish the attainment of honest 654
signalling from failure to do so. Simulation parameters are as 655
per ﬁgure 5 plus m = 0.05. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 656
9 Both panels depict results from the same simulation runs sam- 657
pling 17×17 evenly distributed points in the C1×C2 parameter 658
space (B = 0 in all cases). Each data point represents an aver- 659
age over 25 simulations runs. Upper panel: the frequency with 660
which honest signalling equilibria are discovered on channel 1 661
(grey isoclines) and channel 2 (heavy isoclines). Lower panel: 662
the signed diﬀerence between the mean signal range on each 663
channel at honest signalling equilibrium, ¯ ρ1− ¯ ρ2. Isoclines are 664
labeled to indicate scenarios for which ¯ ρ1 ≫ ¯ ρ2, ¯ ρ1 = ¯ ρ2, and 665
¯ ρ1 ≪ ¯ ρ2. (This measure is undeﬁned for the upper right quad- 666
rant since no honest signalling equilibria were achieved in this 667
region of parameter space). Parameters as ﬁgure 8. . . . . . . 39 668
2910 The data from the lower left quadrant of ﬁgure 9 (i.e., where 669
both B > C1 and B > C2) are aggregated and replotted 670
against C1 − C2. The solid curve represents the signed diﬀer- 671
ence between the proportion of simulation runs that achieve 672
honest signalling equilibrium on channel 1 and the proportion 673
that achieved honesty on channel 2. The dashed curve repre- 674
sents ¯ ρ1 − ¯ ρ2, being the signed diﬀerence between the average 675
equilibrium signal range on channels 1 and 2 (std. devs. were 676
small, varying being between 1% and 3% of the mean). . . . . 40 677
11 Competition between two established wild-type signalling sys- 678
tems with varying initial frequency in a randomly mixed ini- 679
tial population. The solid curve represents the proportion of 680
N = 20 simulation runs that ﬁxate on the extravagant invad- 681
ing signalling system (C = −2) after G = 5000 post-contact 682
generations of evolution. The dashed curve represents the pro- 683
portion of runs in which the less extravagant incumbent sig- 684
nalling system (C = −1) ﬁxated. B = 0 for all runs. . . . . . . 41 685
300
C
−ive B
+ive B
0
−ive C +ive C
B
Figure 1: Schematic representation of the current model’s B × C parameter space, indi-
cating the handicap signalling regime suggested by Zahavi (1975, 1977), C < 0 (diagonal
hatching), and the handicap signalling regimes suggested by models due to Grafen (1990a):
B ≥ 0 and C < 0 (cross-hatching); Godfray (1991) and Maynard Smith (1991): vertical
arrow deﬁned by B > 0 and C = 0; and Hurd (1995): horizontal arrow deﬁned by B = 0
and C < 0). The current model predicts that honesty will be stable when B > C (grey
shaded region) which is not consistent with Zahavi’s original claim, but is consistent with
the ﬁndings of the subsequent models represented here.
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Figure 3: Change in signaller behaviour (upper panel) and receiver behaviour (lower panel)
over evolutionary time under conditions that support honest signalling (B = 0, C = −1;
solid curves) and conditions that do no (B = 0, C = +1; dashed curves). For signallers, a
pair of curves indicate evolutionary change in the magnitude of advertisements (a) given by
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Ten evolved signaller mappings, q  → a, separate into two bundles, one for scenarios where
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370
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000
A
d
v
e
r
t
i
s
e
m
e
n
t
 
(
a
)
 
 
Generation 
C1 = -2.0
C2 = -1.5
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000
E
r
r
o
r
 
(
ε
)
 
Generation 
C1 = -2.0
C2 = -1.5
Threshold
Attention
Figure 8: Change in signaller behaviour (upper panel) and receiver behaviour (lower panel)
over evolutionary time under conditions that support honest signalling on two competing
signalling channels (B = 0, C1 = −2, solid curves; B = 0, C2 = −1.5, dashed curves). For
signallers, a pair of curves for each channel indicate evolutionary change in the magnitude
of advertisements (a) given by highest quality and lowest quality signallers employing the
mean signaller strategy at each generation during a representative simulation run. For
receivers, two curves indicate evolutionary change in the receiver error (¯ ǫ) produced by
receivers employing the mean receiver strategy for each channel at each generation during
the same simulation run. A third curve (grey) indicates the proportion of receivers paying
attention to channel 1. The dotted grey line at ¯ ǫ = ǫthresh = 0.3 indicates the threshold
on receiver error that was used to distinguish the attainment of honest signalling from
failure to do so. Simulation parameters are as per ﬁgure 5 plus m = 0.05.
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represents an average over 25 simulations runs. Upper panel: the frequency with which
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